Freitag, 12. Dezember 2014
In 2013 we started a security study on one of the most widespread SSO protocols: OpenID. As described in previous posts, OpenID is a decentralized protocol, which provides a way to prove that a user controls an Identifier – URL.IDC. Additionally, OpenID is designed to support the usage of arbitrary IdPs: “An end user can freely choose which OpenID Provider to use ...“.
Considering the properties of OpenID, we came up with the idea to study the relation between the IdP, generating the authentication token, and the Identifier URL.Idc contained in the token. In other words – is this relation critical regarding the security of OpenID implementations deployed on the SPs.
Mittwoch, 10. Dezember 2014
Dienstag, 9. Dezember 2014
Maximizing the effectiveness of compute power using an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud service is a common technique nowadays. Private (IaaS) clouds are often advertised as being more secure as public ones, simply because they are "provisioned for exclusive use by a single organization" (source). However, private and public clouds share the same technology; there is no fundamental difference in the techniques employed.
When evaluating the security of XML based services, one should always consider DTD based attack vectors, such as XML External Entities (XXE)...
Printers belong arguably to the most common devices we use. They are available in every household, office, company, governmental, medic...
Inspired by James Kettle 's great OWASP AppSec Europe talk on CORS misconfigurations, we decided to fiddle around with CORS security i...
One year ago, we received a contract as a PDF file. It was digitally signed. We looked at the document - ignoring the "certificate is n...
In this post, we provide a security analysis of Microsoft Rights Management Services (RMS) and present two working attacks: We complete...