Montag, 30. November 2020

Single Sign-On Security: Security Analysis of real-life OpenID Connect Implementations

This is a guest blogpost by Lauritz Holtmann. He wrote his master thesis:

"Single Sign-On Security: Security Analysis of real-life OpenID Connect Implementations"

Lauritz summarizes his exciting results in the following. The thesis was supervised by Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, and Jörg Schwenk. You can read find his full thesis here.

OpenID Connect 1.0 and OAuth 2.0 are the Single Sign-On Protocols that are implemented in modern web applications. In this post, we outline common issue patterns that were discovered in popular OpenID Connect implementations, give concrete examples of vulnerabilities, and give recommendations for adjustments to the OpenID Connect specification.

Dienstag, 21. Juli 2020

Shadow Attacks: Hiding and Replacing Content in Signed PDFs

Last year we presented How to Spoof PDF Signatures. We showed three different attack classes. In cooperation with the CERT-Bund (BSI), we contacted the vendors of affected PDF applications to inform them about the vulnerabilities and to support them in developing countermeasures. Most vendors reacted promptly and closed the reported vulnerabilities promptly.
One of those three attack classes was Incremental Saving Attacks (ISA). The proposed countermeasures aimed to distinguish PDF objects appended to the file via updates into dangerous and non-dangerous. In other words, black and whitelisting approaches were used. 

Naturally, this countermeasure succeeds as long as the PDF update contains evil objects. So we came up with the idea to attack PDFs with only non-dangerous updates. We achieve this by adding invisible, malicious content when creating the PDF document (before it is signed) and to reveal them after signing.
Today, we present Shadow Attacks! Our evaluation of 28 PDF applications reveals that 15 of them, including Adobe Acrobat and Foxit Reader, are vulnerable.
We responsibly disclosed all affected vendors. Together with the CERT-Bund (BSI), we supported the vendors in developing suitable countermeasures. The attacks are documented in CVE-2020-9592 and CVE-2020-9596.
Full results are available in our vulnerability report and on our website.

Montag, 20. Januar 2020

CVE-2020-2655 JSSE Client Authentication Bypass

During our joint research on DTLS state machines, we discovered a really interesting vulnerability (CVE-2020-2655) in the recent versions of Sun JSSE (Java 11, 13). Interestingly, the vulnerability does not only affect DTLS implementations but does also affects the TLS implementation of JSSE in a similar way. The vulnerability allows an attacker to completely bypass client authentication and to authenticate as any user for which it knows the certificate WITHOUT needing to know the private key. If you just want the PoC's, feel free to skip the intro.

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